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Background Beliefs,
Religious Plurality, and the
Parity Thesis

The goals of this chapter fall into two groups. The first group
deals with tying together several loose ends surrounding the role of
background beliefs in CP or, more generally, in noninferential me
diated practices. Thus in Section I I answer the question whether
Alston is better off, epistemically, with CP than Plantinga is with
an exaggerated Alstonian epistemic practice. The second group
surrounds the issue of why Alston himself finally abandons the
parity thesis between PP and CP. The goals of the remaining sec
tions are first to explain Alston's position on how religious diver
sity affects the rationality of engaging in CP and second to explain
how his view fits in with the argument of this essay, as far as we
have reached.
I.

The Resurrected Evidentialist

My argument in Chapter 7 suggests that Plantinga's defense of
PTPh or more specifically PTPh must appeal to an exaggerated ver
sion of CP, thus opening the door to an arbitrary generation of
beliefs or demanding a retreat to natural theology or other discur
sive bases for theistic belief. I conclude that PTPh and hence PTPh
are not true. Does PTA fare any better? This question cannot be
answered without some further work. I argued that both CP and
PP, as Alston construes them, are practices in which there is a
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lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the belief gener
ated by that experience: if one believes "I see a tree," then one does
not fail to affirm, when queried, something like "I am being ap
peared to treely"; if one sees God's creative work in this flower,
then one does not fail to affirm, when asked, something like "I am
being appeared to God-createdly." But I have also argued that CP
is a noninferential mediated practice whereas PP is a conceptual
reading practice. The background belief challenge suggests that
there can be nothing in an experience itself that allows one to de
scribe the phenomenology of the experience by propositions such
as "It is of God." This is true for the same reasons that no experi
ential phenomenon can itself be described as "It is of Tim Tib
betts." In short, background beliefs are important when it comes
to the experience of, and corresponding beliefs about, epistemically
unique and spatiotemporal nonrooted individuals. The time has
come for a further analysis of this claim, especially as it applies to CP.
PP does not simply generate, as noted in Chapter 2, beliefs
about epistemically unique physical objects; that is, it also gener
ates beliefs about certain kinds of things, it classifies things. It is
this fact, among others, that allows PP to be a conceptual-reading
practice. We all seem to share, roughly, the same conceptual
scheme, or at least we do pragmatically. Once PP is set into mo
tion by an experience, the belief generated is one in which the
physical object scheme allows us to read off a physical object be
lief. But there is a distinction to be made between PP as a classify
ing practice generating beliefs such as "Those are desks" and
"These are trees" and the epistemic practice (or subpractice)' that
allows us to generate beliefs about epistemically unique physical
individual objects, such as "The desk in my office is brown" and
"The tree in my front yard needs cutting down." One simple way
to individuate between these two practices is to recall a point I
made in discussing Alston's account of perception, namely, that
with PP one has a set of concepts (e.g., tree, house, car) that can be
applied in situations that are novel to the perceiver. One can im
mediately objectify new perceptual experiences into physical object
concepts, since the concepts are general enough to apply to newly
experienced objects. This is not the case with epistemically unique
physical objects such as Suzie's house. One may have the concept
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"house" before seeing the buildings in a neighborhood that is new
to one's experience and hence be able to identify the buildings as
houses. But one does not have a complete enough concept of
Suzie's house before an experience (obtained in person or through
someone's description of the house-see Chapter 3, Section 4) of
Suzie's house, since that concept is not a general one applicable to
many houses but a unique one that applies only to Suzie's house.
So, one cannot have detailed concepts of Suzie's house before be
ing "introduced" to the particular house that is Suzie's. And reap
plication of such concepts relies on having memories, not of other
houses that are like Suzie's (or at least not solely so) but of this
particular house and one's earlier experiences of it. In short, the
concepts we attach to unique objects are attached not by our being
able to recognize, for example, that this is a house of the Suzie
kind (as if there were more than one house that is Suzie's) but
rather by our remembering earlier experiences of this (numerically
the same) house. This distinction in approach suggests a distinction
in epistemic practice. As I argued in Chapter 3, in PP the concepts
that attach to epistemically unique physical objects are made up of
kind concepts and information about local spatiotemporal location.
Insofar as this position is right, then the practice, or subpractice, of
forming beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects is a
conceptual-reading practice. Let us call this (sub)practice that gen
erates beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects the
"unique physical object practice."
Parallel to the distinction between PP and unique physical object
practice, we should recognize a distinction between what I call "re
ligious practice" and CP. Since CP generates beliefs about the
unique God of the Christian faith, it seems somewhat parallel to
unique physical object practice and its generation of beliefs about
epistemically unique individuals. The practice that allows us to
form beliefs with religious (as opposed to specifically Christian)
content seems parallel to PP. The content of these religious beliefs
is a little hard to spell out, but perhaps one could point to phenom
enological analyses such as Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum.2
Many (dare I say most?) humans have at least a (more or less)
2. Rudolf Otto,

The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in

trans. John
rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, I978), pp. I2-30.

the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational,
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believe the best choice here is a subpractice; see Chapter I I for details.
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vague sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the
merely (humanly) personal. But as the plurality of religions indi
cates, there are many ways to understand this reality. At the bot
tom of all these, I suggest, is this awareness of a nonhuman, non
physical reality. Religious practice puts us into contact with this
reality. The additional and uniquely Christian beliefs generated do
not come via religious practice but through CP, a practice that
allows us to identify the experience as an experience of God the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or the First Person of the Trinity,
that is, as an experience of an epistemically unique individual. It is
CP, and not religious practice, that clearly is a noninferential medi
ated practice.
It is CP, then, as contrasted to religious practice, that requires
the use of background beliefs. Religious practice does not, for we
have a conceptual scheme that alone allows us to objectify our ex
perience into the kinds of vague categories I suggested above.3 We
need the background beliefs for the doctrinal content of the Chris
tian beliefs. Do these background beliefs need justification? Here I
plan to fulfill my promise of explaining why the ranking of PP
over CP is an epistemic ranking and not merely one based on the
cognitive desirability of PP's features over CP's.
I suggest that the background beliefs required in CP need justi
fication as much as do those beliefs required for the exaggerated
CP to which I appealed in discussing Plantinga. I argued in Plan
tinga's case that the content of the background beliefs is substan
tively theistic, for there is no necessary lingo-conceptual link be
tween the experience generating theistic beliefs and the beliefs
generated. To avoid arbitrariness in belief, then, the evidentialist's
demands seem to press in on Plantinga's position. It is thus fairly
3. J. William Forgie's work, from which I drew the background belief chal
lenge, may be faulty since it does not distinguish clearly enough between religious
practice and other practices. If "God" picks out only the vague kinds of charac
teristics that religious practice allows us to, then Forgie's argument needs refining.
Compare, for example, an epistemic practice that allows me to be justified in be
lieving that I am in the presence of a human person as opposed to one in which I
am justified in believing that I am in the presence of Tom Tibbetts. In the former,
I do not have to identify the person as Tom or Tim, but in the latter I do. But it is
only in the latter that I need background information in the form of beliefs. There
is more on this general view in the text, but what is said there applies not only to
Alston's work but to Forgie's as well.

Background Beliefs and Religious Plurality

[

obvious that theistic* beliefs need justification. Although perhaps
less obvious, so do the background beliefs for CP. Are these sub
stantively theistic in content? Yes, but not only so. They are sub
stantively Christian in content. Even though what I have said about
religious practice allows for some religious content in experiences
generating religious beliefs,4 this experiential content itself does not
allow for the generation of specifically Christian beliefs. The
source of the Christian content, I suggest, rests entirely in the
background beliefs-call them "Christian* beliefs." And surely
these need justification.
Granting the need for a religious content in the experience gen
erating Christian beliefs (to allow for the spirit of Alston's direct
approach), there is still nothing phenomenologically in the experi
ence that makes it a Christian experience. What would make an
experience a Christian experience, as opposed to a merely religious
experience? For that matter, what could make an experience a
Christian, as opposed to a merely religious, experience? I propose
that nothing in experience alone can do so. When one holds Chris
tian* beliefs, one may take the experience (and perhaps legit
imately so) to be Christian. But taking an experience to be explic
itly Christian and its actually being so are not at all the same thing.
Why, then, understand any religious experience to be a Christian
experience? Why not Buddhist, or Hindu? There is, I suggest, a
kind of arbitrariness in doing so, a kind of arbitrariness in the use
of CP. Of course, one does not typically select CP over some other
practice, such as a Hindu practice (except, perhaps, in cases of radi
cal conversion). Rather, one grows into the use of CP. So the arbi
trariness is not one of choice but one that presses the question,
what justifies my practicing CP rather than some other noninferen
tial mediated practice? To avoid this arbitrariness, Christian* be
liefs need justification. CP's noninferential mediated nature makes
it epistemically inferior to PP.
We can see the same point if we return to the background belief
challenge. Compare the Tom and Tim Tibbetts case to the case of
God. The reason one knows that it is Tim rather than Tom one
4·

There is, in other words, a lingo-conceptual link between religious experi

ence and the beliefs religious practice generates. I am not convinced that this is best
construed theistically; it may be even vaguer than that.
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sees in the next yard is not given by the phenomena but requires
that one have the belief that Tom is out of town. This background
belief to which one appeals is of a fairly high level in terms of its
content vis-a-vis Tom and Tim. Furthermore, although we do
come to recognize human persons by their features, actions, and
personality, as Alston says, we do so only on being introduced to
them and learning their individual names. Our background beliefs
about the persons we know seem to be fully personal in their con
tent. I remember (or at least it is within the range of my memory)
that Jack appears the way this phenomenal experience I am now
having appears. Thus, my noninferential mediated generation of
the belief "This is Jack," is justified. It will not do, as Alston sug
gests, simply for it to be true that such and such an appearance is
sufficient for the appearance to be "ofJack" in the circumstances in
which I find myself. 5 The circumstances are too important to be
passed over so lightly, for it is these circumstances that contain the
information enabling me to objectify this experience as an experi
ence of Jack. Since the circumstances cannot be confined to spa
tiotemporal information picked up in the experience, this informa
tion must be brought to the experience, presumably as beliefs. The
background beliefs needed for identifying individual persons seem
always to have a content that contains reference to that unique per
son and thus, to avoid arbitrary application of proper names to
phenomenal experiences that do not "contain" the proper-name in
formation, the background beliefs need justification.
Why should it be any different with God and experiences of
him? In Alston's case, if one does need background beliefs, these
cannot be without (theistic) Christian content. If they were with
out such content, and given the constraint that no experience can
be phenomenologically of the Christian God, then how could they
give rise to the generation of a Christian belief, at least one with
content that is specifically about the unique individual, God the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Assuming that they do need to
have Christian content, then the beliefs need either inferential or
noninferential justification. If, on the one hand, they are justified
5·

Alston has suggested to me that I am not willing to be externalist enough
about the circumstances. Here, I guess, is the proverbial parting of the ways, since
I think he is all too willing to be externalist where he ought not to be.
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via inference, Alston's position succumbs to the evidentialist, just
as Plantinga's does. On the other hand, if they are justified nonin
ferentially, we are back into the same kind of infinite regress laid at
Plantinga's feet. There must be, somewhere, a nonexperiential jus
tification of theistic Christian beliefs.6
Here perhaps Alston can suggest that one need only be justified
in the background beliefs (and not need to justify them) and the
regress does not get started. But the need for being justified is all
my argument rests on. Unlike Alston's appeal to similar strategies
in other contexts-for example, where one may be justified in a
certain epistemic principle and that enables one to be justified in
another belief-there is no distinction in epistemic level between
the belief in question and the theistic background belief. The latter
does not function at a different level epistemically; it is a first-order
belief and not a second-order principle. Alston may appeal to his
externalist account of justification for these background beliefs, but
one still can raise the infinite regress problem as long as the exter
nalist account is rooted in experience. How are these justified (as
opposed to justifiable)? My suggestion is that they too must appeal
to background beliefs that in turn appeal to background beliefs,
and the regress is off and running.
Thus Alston's parity thesis appears to be in little better shape
than Plantinga's. The deliverances of PP are conceptual-reading be
liefs whereas those of CP are noninferential mediated beliefs. The
latter are such that the background beliefs needed for their justifica
tion stand in need of justification themselves. As such, they cannot
have the same strength of justification as conceptual-reading be
liefs. I have more to say about CP in Chapters 10 and 11, but I
believe the argument here shows that the observation about back
ground beliefs made in Chapters 2 and 3 is epistemically impor
tant. Conceptual-reading beliefs differ from noninferential medi
ated beliefs in that the latter have an additional step needed for
their epistemic justification. The evidentialist specter is present in
Alston's epistemology of religion as well as Plantinga's.
6. We need to consider the theistic, nonlawlike kind of externalism mentioned
in Chapter 7, Section 6, as a possibility. Alternatively, could we not be introduced
to God much as we are introduced to a new human being? Is this nonexperiential?
What about the credulity disposition? I consider these issues in Chapter 1 I.
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Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Checking
Procedures

In Perceiving God, Alston moves away from the parity thesis. He
does so for two reasons. The second bears the burden of my con
cern in the next section, but the first deserves to be recognized as
well.
In his chapter on the Christian mystical perceptual practice
(CMP), Alston contends that CMP satisfies the conditions for ra
tional acceptance. As with sense practice (SP) (what I have called
PP), CMP is acquired and engaged in long before one is explicitly
aware of the practice, it involves procedures for evaluating its out
puts, it is set in a broader context of epistemic practices that in
volve interacting with perceived objects, it is socially transmitted
and monitored, it depends on and is connected with other prac
tices, it is subject to change, and it has its own set of distinctive
presuppositions. There are differences, of course. CMP has a dis
tinctive conceptual scheme, a distinctive subject matter, and its
own overrider system of beliefs. Alston also gives an account of
how CMP is to be distinguished from other epistemic practices,
including other religious epistemic practices.
In defense of CMP's being rationally engaged in, Alston sug
gests that he has already made a prima facie case for its being so,
since it is a socially established doxastic practice. But he does con
sider at length reasons for denying that it is a genuine, full-fledged
practice. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the charges
that CMP is only partially distributed among the population, that
CMP is not a widely shared practice, and that it is not a source of
new information. The important issue for us is the supposed lack
of checks and tests of particular perceptual beliefs. Alston fills sev
eral pages dealing with this charge and, although he admits that
CMP does lack the kind of checking system SP has, this does not
show that CMP is unreliable. All that need concern us here is what
Alston says toward the end of his discussion of the overrider sys
tem.
I am quite prepared to recognize that a checking system of the sort
we have in SP is an epistemic desideratum. If we were shaping the
world to our heart's desire, I dare say we would arrange for all our
fallible doxastic practices to include such checks. It certainly puts us
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in a better position to distinguish between correct and incorrect per
ceptual beliefs than what we have in CMP. But though this shows
that CMP is epistemically inferior to SP in this respect, that is not
the same as showing that CMP is unreliable or not rationally en
gaged in, or that its outputs are not prima facie justified. 7
Here Alston links explicitly what he earlier referred to as "cog
nitively desirable features" to epistemic concerns. An epistemic
practice's failing to have certain cognitively desirable features that
another has does indeed indicate a difference in epistemic level. So
if SP is epistemically superior to CMP because of the kind of
checking procedures available to it, even though the latter is still
rationally acceptable, one suspects that a strict parity thesis be
tween SP and CMP is not forthcoming. Still, both are prima facie
rationally engaged in, on Alston's account, and that is all he sets
out to show in Perceiving God.
3.

Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Religious
Plurality

The problem of religious diversity for the rationality of engaging
in CMP, says Alston, cannot be handled in the same way as others
he discusses, that is, by calling attention to "epistemic imperialism"
or the "double standard." The intuition behind the problem with
plurality is that "if the general enterprise of forming perceptual re
ligious beliefs is carried on in different religions in such a way as to
yield incompatible results, no such practice can be considered to be
reliable, so none is rationally engaged in. "8 But Alston uses consid
erable space spelling out exactly what the issue is. There are two
questions. In what way are religious practices incompatible, and
why or how does this incompatibility cast doubt on CMP's ratio
nality? I take these in order.
The incompatibility, says Alston, is not an internal one because
there is more than one practice for forming perceptual religious
beliefs. Any incompatibility is an interpractice problem, not an in
trapractice problem. Thus, if there is incompatibility it is between
the deliverances of two separate practices. If one takes it that these
7. Alston, Perceiving God, p.
8. Ibid., p. 255.
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deliverances are of the singular subject-predicate form and that
they attribute to the subject some putatively perceivable attribute
or activity, then there are two questions to ask. First, is the subject
the same? Second, are the predicates incompatible?
'
Again, we can take these in order. Although there are cases in
which the subjects of the beliefs delivered by various religious epi
stemic practices are (taken to be) the same (such as in Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam), this is not always the case. The beliefs the
Christian has about God are quite different than those held by the
Hindu, and although different beliefs about an object do not entail
that the objects are truly different, there seems to be good reason
to think they are. So in these cases, even if the predicates attribut
able to perceived religious objects are incompatible, that does not
show that the beliefs are incompatible unless it can be shown that
the objects are the same.
On the predicate side, much of the apparent contradiction is not
due to the positive content of the beliefs but rather to what Alston
calls "implicit denials." Attributing to God the message that Jesus
is his Son is not incompatible with Mohammed being God's
prophet unless the former message also contains a rider claiming
that Jesus' work is the only way to salvation. Even Thomas Aqui
nas thought that mystical claims of God's being an undifferentiated
unity (such as we find in Vedanta or Yoga mystical literature) are
not incompatible with claims that God is personal. There must be a
denial of the identity between God-as-undifferentiated-unity and
God-as-personal assumed by the one who holds the former. At the
very least, says Alston, caution is called for here. Seeming contra
dictions are not always what they appear.
To identify contradictions, Alston raises the issue of how doxas
tic practices in other religions are to be separated from CMP. Most
of his discussion in Perceiving God is cast in terms of "God." But
nontheistic religions do not, obviously, describe the object of their
epistemic experiences in that language. So Alston broadens his
conception of religious (what he calls "mystical") practice by stat
ing that "it is what is taken by the subject to be a direct experiential
awareness of the Ultimate," where by Ultimate he means "the ulti
mate determiner of one's existence, condition, salvation, destiny,
or whatever. "9 This broader conception of religious practice pro9.

Ibid., p.
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vides the basis for showing the incompatibility of the output of the
competing practices. It is helpful to quote Alston here at some
length:
One's conception of the Ultimate will differ in different religions.
Even where the broad outlines of the conception is the same, as it is
among the various theistic religions, the details will differ. After all,
a religiously very important feature of the Christian, Jewish, and
Moslem conceptions of the Ultimate has to do with God's purposes
for mankind and His work in history; and the account of this varies
drastically from one of these traditions to another. And all these will
diverge sharply from the conception of the Ultimate in Buddhism
and certain forms of Hinduism, where the Ultimate is not thought
of as a personal agent. Let's further note that one's conception of
God (the Ultimate) enters, to a greater or lesser degree, into a par
ticular subject's identification of the perceived object as God (Brah
man ...). When I take God to be present to me I will, if I am a
Christian, but not if I am Moslem or a Hindu, most likely take it
that He who became man in the person ofjesus Christ to save us .from our
sins is present to me. Indeed, it is generally true that we make use of
what we believe about perceived objects when we perceptually iden
tify them. When I take the person I see across the room to be Joe
Walker, I thereby take him to be the person with whom I went to
college, who lives two blocks from me, and so on.Because of this
leakage of the background belief system into perceptual beliefs, the
latter will be incompatible with each other across religious tradi
tions, even if the predicates attributed in these perceptual beliefs are as

compatible with each other as you like. 10

The upshot of his discussion is that, even if the perceptual beliefs
we have about God do not conflict themselves, the practices of
forming such beliefs are still subject to serious conflict by virtue of
the associated belief systems.
After considering two ways one might strive to show that the
associated belief systems are not incompatible (one is by trimming
the exclusivistic claims from the various religions and the other is
Hick's Kantian strategy), Alston says that most practitioners of re
ligion are pre-Kantian in their beliefs, that is, they are realists about
them. So, in fact, from the point of view of the actual practice of
believers, the various religions are incompatible in just the way
Alston suggests.
IO.

Ibid., pp.
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A second important question Alston discusses is why or how
religious plurality influences the rationality of engaging in CMP.
He considers two versions of an argument in which it is suggested
that religiously diverse results of mystical practices lead �o the dis
crediting of CMP. The stronger version is developed from "a natu
ralist line." It suggests that the best explanation for the radical in
commensurability of mystical practice output is that each result is
nothing more than an internally generated practice, with no refer
ent beyond the practitioners. But, says Alston, there is no reason
to assume that this is the best explanation. There could very well
be aspects of reality so difficult for us to discern that we end up
with quite different results when we try to discern them. A more
modest version of the charge against the rationality of engaging in
any religious epistemic practice, and hence the practice of CMP, is
"to suggest that the diversity is best explained by supposing that
none of the competing practices is a reliable way of determining
what that reality is like. "11 The argument behind this suggestion is
that if one of the practices were reliable it would show itself to be.
But why, says Alston, should we assume that?
There is another possibility, however. Given the rich diversity
among religious doxastic practices, only one, if any, of the prac
tices can be reliable. Why suppose it is CMP? There are many rea
sons internal to CMP, but do we not need reasons external to the
practice, since all the practices presumably have internal reasons?
The critic will suggest that no such external reasons are forthcom
ing, so there is no reason to engage in CMP or, for that matter, in
any other religious doxastic practice. Alston responds that perhaps
there are external reasons, but he passes over them and takes the
worst-case scenario by assuming that there is no external evidence.
He concludes that the justificatory efficacy of CMP is not dissipated
but may be significantly weakened by the fact of religious diversity.
It is not dissipated because there is a significant difference be
tween cases of religious diversity and nonreligious diversity. Con
sider the different observation reports of an accident or competing
means of predicting the weather. In both kinds of case there are
accepted means by which to resolve the dispute, even when one
cannot in fact use those means. Hence, when the reports or
I I.

Ibid. ' p.
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methods appear to conflict, there is at least the possibility of reso
lution. It is this very possibility of resolution that dissipates the
rationality of engaging in all these diverse means of predicting the
weather or trusting everyone's report about an accident. But with
the case of religious diversity there is no possible means of resolu
tion. So why then take the absence of such means to count against
the reliability of the practice? Alston suggests that there is no good
reason to do so and hence that religious diversity does not dissipate
the rationality of engaging in CMP.
It does reduce the strength of the justification, however. The
basic reason is that, although it is possible to imagine ways we
might differ in our viewing the world with competing SPs (say, by
a "Cartesian" practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an
indefinitely extended medium that is more or less concentrated at
various points or a "Whiteheadian" practice of seeing the world as
a series of momentary events growing out of one another vs. our
"Aristotelian" practice of seeing the world as made up of more or
less discrete objects scattered through space), such a possibility is
just a possibility. With mystical practice, the possibility is actu
alized. The various practitioners of mystical practices do indeed
view ultimate reality differently. If this problem did not exist, pre
sumably CMP would be taken to be more strongly trustworthy.
Engaging in CMP remains prima facie rational, even if one cannot
see how to solve the problem of religious diversity. But the
strength of its overall rational status is less than that of other prac
tices, such as SP, where there is no problem of diversity, as a mat
ter of fact. And so Alston does not see himself as committed to
parity between CMP and SP (CP and PP).
If Alston is correct about this last point, then CP and PP do not
share the same strength (or level) of epistemic status, although they
are both prima facie rational. But in addition to the reason put
forth in his discussion of religious diversity, there is Alston's point
about checking procedures and epistemic desiderata, as well as the
position argued throughout this book that there is a distinction be
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices,
with CP being the latter and PP and unique physical object practice
the former. So there is a triple reason to reject PTX as anything
close to a complete description of the relationship between the ra
tional status of CP and PP.
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I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider some of
'
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those sugges
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to
suggest and defend a new parity thesis.

